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Abstract
Once they have observed information, hindsight biased agents fail to remember how
ignorant they were initially, “they knew it all along.” We formulate a theoretical model
of this bias, providing a foundation for empirical measures, and implying that hindsight
biased agents learning about volatility will underestimate it. In an experiment involving
67 students from Mannheim University, we find that hindsight bias reduces volatility esti-
mates. In another experiment, involving 85 investment bankers in London and Frankfurt,
we find that more biased agents have lower performance. These findings are robust to
differences in location, information, overconfidence and experience.
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Hindsight bias, risk perception and investment
performance
1 Introduction
Psychologists have extensively documented the prevalence of cognitive biases and devia-
tions from rational choice. Are these results relevant for actual financial markets? Pro-
fessionals, operating in their natural habitat and with a lot at stake, could be expected
to behave rationally. Biases could be weeded out by learning and experience. Market
forces and economic environments could induce optimizing. The present paper combines
experimental evidence from the lab and from the field to shed light on these issues.
Decision making in financial markets relies crucially on information processing and
learning. Efficient learning requires comparing new information to previous expectations.
For example, after earnings announcements, investors must compare the news to their
prior expectations. They must take into account the information content of the difference
between the former and the latter. The hindsight bias, which is the inability to correctly
remember one’s prior expectations after observing new information, hinders such infor-
mation processing. Biased agents are not surprised by new information, as “they knew it
all along.” Starting with Fischhoff (1975) and Fischhoff and Beyth (1975), this bias has
been amply documented by the psychology literature.2 This literature has shown that
the hindsight bias arises in a large variety of contexts and that even the knowledge of this
bias does not eliminate it.
The goal of this paper is to study the consequences of the hindsight bias for an impor-
tant type of economic activity: investment and trading. We propose a simple theoretical
model providing a foundation for the measurement of the bias and showing that hindsight
biased agents fail to assess variances correctly. When volatility is stochastic, traders need
to update their assessment of risk, based on return realizations. On observing unexpect-
edly positive or negative returns, rational agents should raise their volatility estimates.
Hindsight biased agents, who “knew it all along,” fail to understand that such returns were
unexpected, and thus underestimate variances. More generally, hindsight biased agents
will form inaccurate beliefs about asset returns, leading to suboptimal trades and inferior
financial performance. For example, hindsight biased agents underestimating volatility
will underprice options and fail to hedge appropriately. Hindsight biased agents will also
fail to call in questions economic analyses at odds with the facts. And they will fail to
estimate accurately the difference between their information and that of other traders.
This will undermine their ability to earn trading profits based on superior information.
To test the hypothesis that the hindsight bias hinders learning about risk, we designed
a lab experiment involving 67 students from Mannheim University. We gave the partic-
ipants financial data and asked them to estimate variances. Then, we gave them new
2For an extended review of the literature and a discussion of psychological explanations of the bias
see Christensen-Szalanski and Wilham (1991), Hawkins and Hastie (1990) and Roese (2004).
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data and asked them to again estimate variances. The idea was to study how participants
process this new data to update their volatility estimates. The experiment involved two
treatments. In the first treatment, the experimenter reminded the participants of their
initial estimates, thus muting the bias. In the second one, the experimenter asked the
participants to remember their initial estimates, so that the bias could manifest itself.
Consistently with our theoretical prediction, in Treatment 1 participants came up with
lower variance estimates than in Treatment 0.
To test the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, we collected data
from 85 investment bankers working in Frankfurt or London. We found these bankers to
be significantly hindsight biased. And yet the questions we asked them related to their
own field of expertise, such as stock market returns, macro variables or characteristics of
the investment banking industry. We also found that more experienced bankers or bankers
with more precise information were not less biased. Using data provided by the bank, we
proxied bankers’ performance by their compensation (including bonuses). Consistent with
the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, we found that the bankers
in the highest earnings category had the lowest bias on average. We first obtained this
finding in the Frankfurt subsample. Then, to test its robustness, we collected additional
data for London. In this new sample we found the same result. We also checked that
our results were not driven by other variables, such as the experience, overconfidence or
information of the bankers.
Our paper is in line with Camerer et al (1989). We use similar methods to measure the
hindsight bias. But our focus and findings differ from theirs. Camerer et al (1989) showed
that markets reduce but don’t eliminate the hindsight bias. We complement this finding
by offering new results on the consequences of the bias for information processing and
financial performance. Another distinguishing feature of our paper is that our findings on
the link between the hindsight bias and performance are based on data collected in the
field, from highly paid and experienced investment bankers. This is in the line of several
recent field experiments on financial decision and psychology.3 Our analysis is also in
the line of several recent papers empirically relating psychological constructs to economic
variables (see Camerer (1987), Fenton O’Creevy (2003), Biais et al (2005), and Glaser
and Weber (2007)).
In the next section we present our theoretical model. In Section 3, we present our lab
experiment. In Section 4, we present our field experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Defining the hindsight bias
The research on hindsight bias started with Fischhoff (1975) and Fischhoff and Beyth
(1975). Let v˜ be a random variable and I0 the decision maker’s information at some point
in time t0. Let t1 be a point in time, when the random event has been resolved. At
time t1 the decision maker possesses information I1, including the original information I0
3For example, Haigh and List (2005) experimentally find that myopic loss aversion is even stronger
for CBOT traders than students, while Sarin and Weber (1993) find that ambiguity aversion reflected in
experimental market prices is also prevalent among investment bankers.
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as well as the outcome of the random variable. The ex—ante expectation of the random
variable is : E(v˜|I0). The ex-post recollection of this ex-ante expectation is: E[E(v˜|I0)|I1].
For a rational decision maker, both expectations have to be equal. In contrast, hindsight
biased agents fail to remember the initial expectation. They forget they knew only I0,
they feel they already knew I1 (or something close to I1) at time 0. Wasserman et
al (1991, p 30) describe this phenomenon as “a projection of new knowledge into the
past accompanied by a denial that the outcome information has influenced judgements.”
Correspondingly, for hindsight biased agents the ex—post recollection of the initial belief
will be closer to the realization than the true ex—ante expectation. Numerous papers in
experimental psychology have shown the prevalence of the hindsight bias and discussed
its measurement (see e.g., Hawkins and Hastie (1990)). Musch (2003) finds empirically
that individual differences in hindsight bias exist. This suggests that this bias acts as a
trait, consistently influencing individual behavior in various environments.
The notion of hindsight bias was initially developed in the context of binary variables:
v ∈ {0, 1}. In that case, the expectation is the probability that the variable takes the
value one. Hindsight bias arises if the ex-post recollection of the ex-ante probability is
greater when the event actually occurred. The bias arising in the general case, where v˜
is not necessarily binary, is often referred to as the “curse of knowledge.” In the present
paper we will not differentiate curse of knowledge and hindsight bias.
Denote by μ the a priori mean of the random variable v˜. Suppose the agent has been
told the realization v of the random variable and is asked to report what was his a priori
belief about the mean of v˜. If rational, he reports E(v˜) = μ. If hindsight biased, he fails to
remember how ignorant he was initially about v˜. By a process of memory reconstruction
he incorporates the new knowledge into his remembrance of the prior expectation (see e.g.,
Carli (1999)). Thus he forms a biased recollection of the prior mean, tilted towards the
realization of the random variable. This can be modelled by specifying the reconstructed
prior mean of the biased agent as a weighted average of the true prior mean and of the
realization of the random variable:
Eˆv(v˜) = ωv + (1− ω)μ(1)
where the constant ω measures the magnitude of the bias and Eˆv denotes the biased ex-
pectation. The subscript denotes that the biased expectation is reported after observing
the realization v of v˜. This formulation is similar to equation (1) in Camerer et al (1989).
When asked to report the a priori mean of the distribution, rational agents are not influ-
enced by the realization of the random variable so that ω = 0. In contrast, biased agents
partially forget the ex—ante expectation. If they are completely biased, they totally forget
the rational prior mean and place all the weight on the realization of the random variable
(ω = 1).
2.2 Adverse consequences of the hindsight bias
Several previous papers have discussed adverse consequences of the hindsight bias (See
Camerer (2005)). For example, Mangelsdorff and Weber (1998) and Madarasz (2008)
show that, in a principal agent relation, the hindsight bias will prevent the principal
from correctly evaluating the performance of the agent. Indeed, biased principals fail to
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remember what was known when the agent’s decision was taken.4 Also, Holzl et al (2002)
offer evidence of hindsight bias about the economic advantages of the European Monetary
Union.
One of the main disadvantages of the hindsight bias is that it prevents rational process-
ing of information and learning from past data. Thus, Fischhoff (1982) notes that the
hindsight bias will prevent one from rejecting one’s hypotheses about the world:
“When we attempt to understand past events, we implicitly test the hy-
potheses or rules we use both to interpret and anticipate the world around us.
If, in hindsight, we systematically underestimate the surprises that the past
held and holds for us, we are subjecting those hypotheses to inordinately weak
tests and, presumably, finding little reason to change them.” (Fischhoff, 1982,
page 343.)
Similarly, observing students analyzing business cases, Buksar and Conolly (1988)
found that the hindsight bias hindered learning from past experience.
In financial markets the inability to be surprised, to learn from the past and to reject
hypotheses can be very damaging. Hindsight biased traders will fail to recognize that their
view of the market was wrong. Hence they will fail to cut their losses when it is optimal
to do so. Hindsight biased investors will inaccurately take into account the informational
content of new signals, such as earnings announcement or macro—news. This will lead
them to form suboptimal portfolios.5 In the remainder of this subsection we focus on the
adverse consequences of the hindsight bias for risk assessment.
Risk is one of the most important elements of the environment of financial decisions.
Correctly factoring risk in these decisions is made difficult by random fluctuations in
volatility. Because of these fluctuations, it is important for agents to conduct efficient
learning about volatility. The hindsight bias prevents such efficient learning. To see this
consider the following simple model. With probability λ the random variable v˜ is normally
distributed with variance σ2 and with probability 1−λ it is normal with variance σ¯2, where
σ¯ > σ. After observing one realization of v˜, the agent has to update her beliefs about the
true variance. Applying Bayes law, rational agents would update the probability that the
variance is low to:
P (σ|v) = f(v|σ)λ
f(v|σ)λ+ f(v|σ¯)(1− λ)
=
λ
σe
− 1
2
(
v−E(v˜)
σ )
2
λ
σe
− 1
2
(
v−E(v˜)
σ )
2
+ 1−λσ¯ e
−1
2
(
v−E(v˜)
σ¯ )
2
=
1
1 + 1−λλ
σ
σ¯e
−1
2
( 1
σ¯2
− 1
σ2
)(v−E(v˜))2 .
4This is in line with the finding of Baron and Hershey (1988). They asked subjects to evaluate
decisions. They found that subjects rated the decision maker better when the outcome was favorable
than when it was not.
5The previous version of this paper included a formal analysis of such inefficient portfolio formation
(see Biais and Weber (2007)).
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Hence:
P (σ|v) = 1
1 + 1−λλ
σ
σ¯e
− 1
2
( 1
σ¯2
− 1
σ2
)(v−μ)2 .(2)
Hindsight biased agents will proceed to a similar updating, except that, instead of using
E(v˜) = μ, they will rely on the biased expectation: Eˆv(v˜) = ωv+ (1−ω)μ. This leads to
the following biased probability:
Pˆv(σ|v) = 1
1 + 1−λλ
σ
σ¯e
− 1
2
( 1
σ¯2
− 1
σ2
)(v−Eˆv(v˜))2
,
where, as in the case of expectations or densities, the hat denotes that the belief is
hindsight biased, and the subscript v denotes that the belief is formed after observing v.
Substituting the biased expectation, we obtain:
Pˆv(σ|v) = 1
1 + 1−λλ
σ
σ¯e
− 1
2
( 1
σ¯2
− 1
σ2
)(1−ω)2(v−μ)2 .(3)
Comparing (2) and (3), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In our framework, when agents must conduct learning about volatility,
those with hindsight bias underestimate volatility.
Agents increase the probability that variance is large when they observe realizations
that differ a lot from their prior expectations, i.e., when they are surprised. Hindsight bi-
ased agents tend to not be surprised: “They knew it all along.” Hence, they underestimate
volatility.
Underestimation of risk, induced by the hindsight bias, will adversely affect decision
making. Biased traders will underestimate the value of options and hedging strategies.
They will inaccurately assess risk return tradeoffs. They will incorrectly estimate risk
premia. Hence, the hindsight bias reduces performance.
2.3 Measuring the hindsight bias
Three main different empirical designs have been used to demonstrate the hindsight bias.
1. In a within person design, subjects are first asked to report their ex-ante expecta-
tions. Then, they learn the realization of the variable. Then they are asked to report
their ex-post recollection of their ex—ante expectations. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975)
provide evidence of hindsight bias in this context.
2. In a between subjects design, subjects each have to report their ex—ante expecta-
tion of an event. Two groups are formed. In group one, participants receive no
information. In group two, participants are told the true outcome of the event, and
yet are asked to report their ex-ante expectation. Fischhoff (1975) offers evidence
of hindsight bias in this context.
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3. In the third design also, two groups are formed. In group two, subjects are told the
true outcome of the event and asked to estimate the average expectation of group
one (knowing that that group had no information). Camerer et al (1989) use this
approach.
To pave the way for our empirical analysis in the next section, we now analyze in
our simple model the measures corresponding to designs 1 and 3. Before being told the
answer to a question, people don’t know it exactly. For them it is a random variable. In
line with the notation of our simple model, we denote by v˜. For simplicity we assume
there is homogeneous information about this random variable.6
In this context, first consider the “within person design” of Fischhoff and Beyth (1975).
In that design, the hindsight bias can be measured by the ratio of i) the agent’s remem-
bered estimate (Eˆv(v˜)) minus his initial estimate (E(v˜)) to ii) the difference between the
realization of the variable (v) and the agent’s initial estimate (E(v˜)). Indeed, this ratio
is equal to:
Eˆv(v˜)−E(v˜)
v −E(v˜) .
Substituting Eˆv(v˜) from equation (1), this is:
ωv + (1− ω)E(v˜)− E(v˜)
v −E(v˜) = ω.
Next, turn to the “between subjects design” of Camerer et al (1989). They form
two groups (A and B) and ask a question to the participants in group B. Denote by
WB the average answer of group B participants. The experimenter gives the answer v
to participants in group A. Then the experimenter asks these participants to assess the
average answer of group B. Denote by Eˆav (WB) the assessment of WB by participant a in
group A. The index of hindsight bias used by Camerer et al (1989) is:
Eˆav (WB)−WB
v −WB
,(4)
i.e., the difference between a’s assessment of the average group B’s answer minus the
actual average, divided by the difference between the true answer and group B’s average
answer. As noted by Camerer et al (1989) rational agents should on average correctly
estimateWB. Hence, for such agents, on average the hindsight bias index is 0. In contrast,
hindsight biased agents will be influenced by the revelation of v. If they are completely
biased, they will totally forget the answer was difficult to find. They will believe the
others gave the exact right answer: v. Thus, for completely biased agents the hindsight
bias index is 1.
Now, consider partially biased agents in the context of our model. Since for simplicity
we assume homogeneous information, all participants in group B should give the same
answer: μ.7 Hence, WB = μ. As stated in equation (1), once told the true answer,
6The previous version of this paper included an extension of this analysis to the case where agents
observe private signals (see Biais and Weber (2007)).
7In the previous version of the paper we showed that the Camerer et al (1989) is also valid with private
information.
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participant a will reconstruct a biased expectation of v˜. Rationally anticipating that
group B participants should answer the common prior, but incorrectly believing that this
prior is the expectation given in equation (1), a will state:
Eˆav (WB) = ω
av + (1− ωa)μ,
where ωa is the hindsight bias parameter of agent a in A. Substituting WB and Eˆav (WB)
in equation (4), we obtain our next Proposition.
Proposition 2: In our framework, the Camerer et al (1989) index for each participant
is equal to his (her) hindsight bias parameter (ωa).
3 Study 1: hindsight bias and risk perception
The goal of this experiment is to test whether hindsight biased agents fail to remember ex—
post how much uncertainty there was ex—ante, and thus come up with lower risk estimates
than unbiased agents. To do so we compare two treatments. In the first treatment, the
hindsight bias is muted because, ex—post, the experimenter reminds the participants of
their ex—ante estimates. In the second treatment, the hindsight bias can arise because the
participants are not told their initial forecasts, rather they are asked to remember these
forecasts. We test the hypothesis that participants give higher volatility estimates in the
first treatment than in the second one.
3.1 Experimental design
The experiment was run in the context of the behavioural finance class, taught by one of
the authors (Martin Weber) to fourth year students in Mannheim University. 67 students
participated in the experiment, which involved two tasks.
The first task was on 29 November 2007. We gave the participants the market price
of 5 German stocks (BASF, IKB, EON, Postbank, Premiere) and 2 commodities (oil and
gold) as well as the euro dollar exchange rate, for November 21 and November 28. We
asked them to predict the price one week later (on December 5). We also asked them to
give an upper bound and a lower bound such that there would be only one chance out
of ten that the December 5 price would be outside the bounds. We then transformed
this confidence interval into a standard deviation using the method introduced by Keefer
and Bodily (1983). Thus we directly elicited their estimate of the expected price and
indirectly estimated their estimate of the standard deviation. We resorted to such an
indirect elicitation because it is more natural and intuitive for participants to give a
confidence interval than a standard deviation.
The second task was a week later, on December 6. At that point we gave the par-
ticipants the realized price for December 5 (and also reminded them of the November 28
price). We asked them again to give us one week ahead (for December 12) expectations
and confidence intervals for the 5 stocks, the 2 commodities and the exchange rate.
Students were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the first treatment,
on December 6, we gave the participants their estimates (prediction and bounds) from
last week (formed on November 29 for December 5). In the second treatment we did not
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remind the participants of their estimates from the previous week. Rather we asked them
to remember and write down these estimates (prediction and bounds). Thus, while in the
first treatment, we muted the hindsight bias by explicitly reminding the participants of
their forecasts, in the second treatment the hindsight bias could manifest itself. 35 students
participated in the first treatment, 32 participated in the second treatment. At each
round, we randomly drew 10 participants who each received 10 euros for participation.8
3.2 Results
Our empirical results are summarized in Table 1. First consider the hindsight bias. As
mentioned above, in this “within person design” the hindsight bias can be measured by
the ratio of i) the difference between the agent’s remembered estimate and his initial
estimate to ii) the difference between the realization of the variable and the agent’s initial
estimate. For each participant in Treatment 1, and for each asset, we compute this ratio.
The first row of Table 1 reports (for each asset) the median across agents for this score
(as well as, in parentheses, the p—value for the hypothesis that the score is equal to 0).9
For all eight assets the median score is positive (and in 4 cases out of 8 it is significantly
different from 0 at the 10% level). Thus participants are hindsight biased on average.
As mentioned above, the hindsight bias stems from the inability of the agents to re-
member ex—post how much uncertainty there was ex—ante. Our experiment offers an
opportunity to document the extent to which people are able to remember previous un-
certainty. In Treatment 1, on December 6, we asked the participants to remember and
state the confidence interval they had previously indicated (on November 29). The initial
confidence interval (given on November 29) and the corresponding implied volatility, re-
flected the participants’ ex—ante perception of uncertainty. The remembered confidence
interval (given on December 6) and the corresponding implied volatility, reflected how
much the agents remembered they were uncertain ex—ante. Thus, for each of the 8 assets,
we compute the median across participants in Treatment 1 of the ratio of i) the volatility
estimate implied by their initial confidence interval on November 29 to ii) the volatility
estimate implied by their remembrance on December 6. The medians are presented in the
second row of Table 1 (along with, in parentheses, the p—values for the hypothesis that
the ratio is equal to 1).10 For 5 assets out of 8 the median ratio is strictly above 1 (and in
four cases this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level). The median ratio is
strictly below one for only one asset (and in that case the difference to 1 is not statistically
significant). This also suggests that participants are hindsight biased on average. As far
as we can tell, this is a new way to document this bias.
As discussed in the previous section, hindsight biased agents are “never surprised” .
In our experiment, in line with the model presented in the previous section, we measure
surprise as the square of the difference between the realization and the expectation, divided
8It’s likely that stronger financial incentives would not have led to significantly different results. As
stated by Camerer and Hogarth (1999, page 8), drawing the lessons of the experimental literature: “In
the kind of tasks economists are most interested in, like trading in markets, bargaining in games and
choosing among risky gambles, the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do not change
average behaviour substantially (although the variance of responses often decreases).”
9The figures have been rounded to three digits.
10The figures have been rounded to three digits.
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by the standard deviation. When this surprise is measured using the initial expectation
and volatility estimates of the agents, we refer to it as the “true surprise.”When it is
measured using the remembered expectation and volatility estimates, we refer to it as the
“biased surprise.” Of course, while the true surprise can be computed in both treatments,
the biased surprise can be computed in Treatment 1 only. The biased surprise is a way
to jointly assess the effect of the hindsight bias on expectations and on variances. For
each asset and each agent we computed the true surprise and, in Treatment 1, the biased
surprise. We then took the medians across agents. These medians are depicted in Table
1, in the third, fourth and sixth rows.11 As expected, there is no systematic ranking
between the true surprises in Treatment 0 and in Treatment 1, and the differences are not
significantly different from 0 (the p—levels are above 10% for all 8 assets). In contrast, for
Treatment 1, the biased surprise is systematically smaller than the true surprise. However,
the difference is significant in only two cases (Gold and dollar).
The main objective of this study was to test the implication from our theoretical
analysis that the inability to be surprised leads biased agents to come up with lower
volatility estimates than unbiased agents (see Proposition 1). To document this point we
computed, for each asset and each participant, the ratio of the initial one—period ahead
volatility estimate (formed on November 29) to the subsequent one—period ahead volatility
estimate (formed on December 6).We then took the medians across agents. These medians
are depicted in the last two rows of Table 1.12 For all assets except Gold, the median ratio
is lower for Treatment 0, and in 4 cases the difference is statistically significant. Thus
the upward revision of volatility forecasts is stronger for participants who are shown their
initial estimates than for participants who are asked to remember initial estimates. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that hindsight biased agents end up with lower volatility
updates, because they are never surprised.
4 Study 2: hindsight bias and performance
While the goal of Study 1 was to analyze the effects of the hindsight bias on the way in
which agents process information, the goal of Study 2 is to test its consequences for the
performance of agents.
4.1 Data Collection
To assess the effect of the hindsight bias on performance in the field we collected psycho-
metric and financial data for bankers working in a large investment bank, in Frankfurt and
London. The psychometric data used in the present study was collected as part of a larger
seven page questionnaire where other psychological constructs were also measured.13 In
the present study we use data relative to the hindsight bias, and also, to control for other
possible effects, the miscalibration bias and the better than average effect.
11The figures have been rounded to integers.
12The figures have been rounded to three digits.
13These variables, together with similar ones collected from another bank are analysed in Glaser et al
(2005).
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The participants in the study are from the trading department of the bank. While they
have various tasks (sales, research and trading), they all participate in the elaboration of
portfolio allocation, trading and investment decisions.
The data was collected by inviting groups of participants into one of two conference
rooms in the bank. There, they filled out the questionnaire under the supervision of an
experimenter. After finishing the questionnaire, which took about 30 minutes, partici-
pants were asked not to talk to their colleagues until the end of the data collection. The
overall data collection effort took about two hours.
The data was collected anonymously with each questionnaire being labelled with a
number. This number was used to sort the questionnaires into earnings categories. For
each number the personnel department of the bank informed us whether the respondent
was in the top, middle or low earnings category. Earnings meant overall compensation,
including bonus. Sorting subjects into three categories was a compromise between our
wishes (as much performance data as possible) and the privacy requirements of the partic-
ipants and institution. It should be noted that the distribution of earnings is skewed (as
suggested by common wisdom and an interview with the human resource department).
Therefore earnings in the low earnings and medium classes are less variable than in the
high earnings class.
We first collected the data in the Frankfurt branch of the bank, on December 5, 2001.
We had 41 respondents (each member of the department who was present that day).
Then, to assess the robustness of our results, we collected similar data, in the London
branch of the bank, on October 9, 2002. There we had 49 respondents, corresponding to
the vast majority of the department.14 Bankers in both locations had similar jobs. In
Frankfurt, the questionnaire had to be approved by the management and by the worker’s
council. We made it very explicit that the study was done by two universities and that
the management of the bank would not see any specific questionnaire. The only data
made available to participants and management were aggregate data. No payments were
given.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 offers some descriptive statistics on the population of bankers in our sample. It
shows that low and mid earnings bankers have approximately the same age in Frankfurt
and London. High earnings bankers are considerably older in London. In Frankfurt the
bankers are relatively equally distributed across the different departments (sales, trading,
research and other). Unfortunately, the London traders did not fill in our questionnaire.
Hence, the bankers in our London subsample only belong to sales and research.
To estimate the hindsight biases of the investment bankers, we used the “between
person” experimental design of Camerer et al (1989). We feared that highly competitive
bankers would find it difficult to admit they could not perfectly forecast the future. Such
considerations could have contaminated hindsight bias measures obtained in a “within
person” design (see e.g., Campbell and Tesser (1983)).15
14In London we received 49 questionnaires. However, only 44 participants were grouped into earnings
categories. Hence, as regards the London subsample, the test of hypotheses is based on 44 subjects
whereas the pure hindsight bias results are based on 49 subjects.
15Also, as Rabin (1998) points out, as economists, we care about a person’s belief about others. Design
11
Our experimental design involved two types of tasks for each participant. In the
first task, they were asked to estimate the true value of some unknown variables (own
estimate). In the second task, they had to guess the average answers of the other group
to some questions (others estimate). In that second task, the participants were given the
true answer to the question asked to the other group. Each subject had to answer ten
questions, five in the own estimate condition and five in the others estimate condition.
We formed two groups in each location, hereafter referred to as Group A and B.
The items we used to measure hindsight bias were taken from the natural habitat of
the bankers. Nevertheless, we used questions for which we thought they did not know
exactly the correct answer. The items were similar for Frankfurt and London. Whenever
it was reasonable, the questions were exactly the same for the two locations. The second
sample however, was collected 10 months later than the first and in a different country.
Hence, we had to change some questions to ensure comparability. For example, while in
the first sample we had a question about the German consumer price index, in the second
sample we changed it to a question about the change in UK retail price index. The
questions we used to measure the hindsight bias as well as the average answers are listed
in Table 3. The numbers are rounded to two digits. For each participant we computed a
measure of the hindsight bias for each of the five question. Then we took the average of
these five numbers.
The results in Table 3 show that the participants in our study are hindsight biased
on average. This finding is similar to those of previous psychometric studies (see e.g.,
Hawkins and Hastie (1990)). Note that the bias is observed in spite of the fact that
the questions are from the natural habitat of the bankers and that the participants are
experienced professionals.16 The degree of hindsight bias is different for different questions
but between 0 and 1 in the majority of the cases.17 Table 4 documents the mean and
the median of hindsight bias of the participants, aggregated across the 5 questions. The
average hindsight bias is very similar in London (.547) and in Frankfurt (.579). It is
significantly lower than 1 and above 0 in both locations. The t—statistics are: 3.60 and
4.35 respectively for London, and 3.43 and 4.72 respectively for Frankfurt.
4.3 Psychometric issues
4.3.1 Precision of information
Does our measure of the hindsight bias really capture this bias, or spuriously reflects
other variables? One possibility would be that it would simply mirror the precision of
the knowledge of the participants regarding the questions we asked them. To check
this we estimated a measure of this precision. In the own estimate treatment, for each
participant and each question, we computed the absolute value of the difference between
the participant’s answer and the true answer. Then we summed these mistakes across
3) captures this aspect.
16We also collected answers to the same questionnaire from economics and management students in
Mannheim University. The mean hindsight bias of the students (.92) is greater than its counterpart for
bankers. But this mean is driven by a few outliers with large bias. The median hindsight bias for students
(.25) is lower than its counterpart for bankers.
17Thus the magnitude of the hindsight bias score observed in this within person design is similar to
that observed in the between person design of Study 1.
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questions. Finally, we normalized the total mistake of each participant by the average
in his group. The greater this ratio, which we hereafter refer to as the mistake ratio,
the lower the precision of the information of the participant. To examine if the hindsight
bias is related to the mistake ratio, we computed the correlation between the two. The
Spearman correlation coefficient is -.0837. The probability to observe such a value under
the null that the two variables are uncorrelated is 44.6%. Hence, the mistake ratio and
the hindsight bias are weakly and insignificantly negatively correlated.
4.3.2 Underconfidence and overconfidence
Another possibility could be that our measure of the hindsight bias would actually reflect
underconfidence. The agent would believe the others to be better informed than him
and than they really are. In this context, while the agent would be surprised by the
realization of the random variable, he/she would believe that the others had predicted it
very accurately and were not surprised. While in theory underconfidence could generate
positive values for the Camerer et al (1989) index, in practice this is unlikely to be driving
the results in our experiment. As mentioned above, in our questionnaire we collected the
answers to “better than average” questions. Participants were asked to answer what
percentage of their colleagues they expected to perform better than themselves along
four dimensions (trading skills, communication skills, market vision, technical skills.)
Averaging across the four dimensions, and across participants, the bankers in our sample
answered that 24.61% of the others had better skills than themselves. This suggests
overconfidence rather than underconfidence. In addition, the correlation across bankers
of the better than average score with the hindsight bias index is not significantly different
from 0. For the Frankfurt bankers it is 0.055 (with a p—value of 0.733). For the London
bankers, the correlation is 0.0975 (p—value = 0.51.)
4.3.3 Miscalibration
Another form of overconfidence which has received attention in finance is miscalibration
(see Biais et al (2005)). In line with Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and Klayman et al
(1999), we measure miscalibration by eliciting confidence intervals. We show participants
ten questions. For each question we ask them to give an upper bound and a lower
bound such that the true answer should lie outside the bounds with only one chance in
ten. If participants were correctly calibrated, the frequency of answers lying outside the
bounds should be 10%. In our sample, the frequency of such answers was 68%. While it
suggests strong miscalibration, this result is not inconsistent with those obtained in other
experiments. In Klayman et al (1999) the correct answer fell outside the participants’
confidence range 57% of the time, while Russo and Schoemaker (1992) found that business
managers had the correct answer outside the stated range between 58% and 38% of the
time.
In line with this literature we thus use as miscalibration score the percentage of ques-
tions for which the true answer fell outside the indicated bounds. To assess if miscali-
bration is independent from the hindsight bias, we computed the correlation between the
miscalibration score and the hindsight bias score. For the London sample this correlation
is equal to -.1 while for the Frankfurt sample it is equal to .16. In both samples, the
correlation is not significantly different from zero.
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4.4 Empirical results
Up to that point we have demonstrated that investment bankers exhibit hindsight bias.
We have found that our measure of hindsight is not significantly correlated with other
variables such as information precision and overconfidence. But does the hindsight bias
affect performance? We now turn to that question.
4.4.1 Main result
As can be seen from Table 5, the hindsight bias (median as well as mean) is lower for
the high earnings category than for the two other categories. The average hindsight bias
is somewhat lower for the low earnings category than for the middle earnings category.
Note however that when one focuses on medians the difference is not large. Table 5 also
shows that, for the middle earnings category, the median bias is much lower than the
mean, while for the high earnings category, the mean bias is much lower than the median,
and for the low earnings category, there is no clear pattern. This suggests that the mean
in the high earnings category is driven down by a few participants with very low bias,
while the mean in the middle earnings category is driven up by a few participants with
very high bias.
In addition, Table 5 shows that the relation between the hindsight bias of bankers
and their performance is prevalent in both locations. Both in London and in Frankfurt
the bankers with the highest performance are also those with the lowest bias. Such
robustness speaks to the out—of—sample validity of the result. It is particularly striking
since, as was mentioned above, we first designed and implemented the experiment with
Frankfurt participants, and then, to evaluate the robustness of our results, we replicated
the same experiment with London participants.
Table 5 also suggests that the result is not driven by other variables, such as age or
experience. Indeed, the age and experience structure differs in the two locations. While
in London the high earnings bankers have longer experience than the middle earnings
bankers (18 versus 9.9), in Frankfurt this is not the case (11.8 versus 12.5. See Table 2).
Tables 6 and 7 provide information about the significance of the differences in hindsight
bias between the three earnings categories. In Table 6, to evaluate significance we rely on
a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test (z-stat).18 The difference between the bias of the
high earnings bankers and that of the middle earnings bankers is significant. The differ-
ence between high earners and low earners is also significant. The difference between low
and mid earners is not significant. This lack of significance is consistent with the skewness
of the earning distribution mentioned above. Some stars receive very high compensation,
rewarding exceptional performance, while the bulk of the bankers have relatively simi-
lar compensation. Consequently, there is only a small difference between the monetary
compensation of the low earnings categories and that of the middle earnings categories.
This small difference is likely to be related to insignificantly different performances, and,
correspondingly, biases.
Table 7 reports the estimated probabilities of the performance of the bankers condi-
tionally on their biases. To construct this table we split the bankers in three categories
18This type of statistics is likely to be appropriate to the extent that it is robust to noise in the data
and outliers.
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in terms of bias (the number of participants was the same in the three categories). Then,
we estimated conditional probabilities based on empirical frequencies. In the table, the
probabilities in each column add up to one. Consistently with the hypothesis that the
hindsight bias reduces performance, the largest number in each column is on the first
diagonal: bankers with the lowest bias are most likely to be high—earners, bankers with
medium bias are most likely to be mid—earners, and bankers with the highest bias are
more likely to be low—earners. To test the null hypothesis that performance is independent
from bias, we performed a Chi square test. Since there are three rows and three columns
in Table 7, the relevant statistic is a Chi Square with 4 degrees of freedom, for which
the critical value at the 5% level is 9.49. The distance between the empirical contingency
table and the theoretical one (computed under the null) was found to be 10.05. The null
hypothesis that performance and bias are independent can thus be rejected at the 5%
level.
4.4.2 Robustness
Experience Experience could influence the bias of the bankers and its impact on their
performance. For example, List (2003) provides evidence on the consequences of market
experience on market anomalies. To control for experience we split the sample of bankers
in two groups. The first group includes the bankers with less than 10 years of experience
and the second group includes the bankers with 10 years of experience or more. Table
8 reports the average bias in each of these two groups. Both for the low—earnings and
the high—earnings bankers, the average bias is higher for the bankers with 10 years of
experience or more. This suggests that experience does not eliminate the hindsight bias.
Table 8 also offers information on the robustness of the link between bias and perfor-
mance after controlling for experience. Both in the junior bankers sub—sample and in the
senior bankers sub—sample, the high earnings bankers are the least hindsight biased. In
fact, the most successful bankers in our sample, i.e., those who are in the highest earnings
category although they are still quite young, are the less biased. The figures in the table
suggest there is no interaction between the effect of hindsight bias on performance and
experience.
Jobs Some participants in the experiment were employed in research, others in sales,
and yet others in trading (or sales and trading). As an additional robustness check, we
analyzed if our results obtained for each of these three different occupational categories.
Table 9 reports the estimated probabilities of the performance of the bankers con-
ditionally on their biases, for the different occupational categories. As for Table 7, to
compute the frequencies in Table 9, we split the bankers in three categories in terms of
bias (the number of participants was the same in the three categories for each job). We
classified participants as having low (resp. high bias) bias if they were among the 33%
least (resp. most) biased of their occupational category. Conditional probabilities were
estimated as empirical frequencies.
The results in Table 9 suggest the link between bias and performance is reasonably
robust across occupational categories in the bank. Consistently with the hypothesis that
the hindsight bias reduces performance, bankers with the lowest bias are most likely to be
high—earners for research and for sales. Bankers with medium bias are most likely to be
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mid—earners, for sales and for trading. And bankers with the highest bias are more likely
to be low—earners for research and for trading. In addition, for research and in trading,
no banker with high bias has high earnings.
Mistakes Yet another robustness check is to examine whether our results still hold
after one controls for the precision of the information of the participants, relative to the
questions asked. As discussed above, for each participant, we computed a mistake ratio,
decreasing with the precision of the answers of the agent in the own answer treatment.
Interestingly, the mistake ratio varies somewhat with performance. Participants with
high performance have an average mistake ratio of .890, while participants with medium
performance have a mistake ratio of 1.004, and participants with low performance have a
mistake ratio of 1.051. Yet, the correlation between the mistake ratio and the hindsight
bias is not significant. The Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the mistake ratio of high
and medium earnings is z = .549, with a p−value of .583. The Wilcoxon rank sum test
comparing the mistake ratio of high and low earnings is z = 1.206, with a p−value of
.2278. And the Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the mistake ratio of medium and low
earnings is z = .595, with a p−value of .5516. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the
mistake ratio is not significantly correlated with the hindsight bias.
To control for mistake ratios, we divided the population of bankers in three categories.
The first category includes the 28 bankers with the lowest mistake ratios (their average
mistake ratio is .425). The second category includes the 28 bankers with intermediate
mistake ratios (their average mistake ratio is .765). The third category includes the 29
bankers with the highest mistake ratios (their average mistake ratio is 1.745). Table 10,
presents the probability of high performance, conditional on bias, estimated for each of
the three categories.
Overall Table 10 suggests some robustness of the link between bias and performance,
across information precisions. Consistently with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias
reduces performance, for the three categories of mistake ratios, bankers with the lowest
bias are the most likely to be high—earners.
Overconfidence Other psychological biases than the hindsight bias could affect perfor-
mance. To control for such possible effects, we use the two other psychometric variables we
measured: the better than average score and the miscalibration score. Table 11 presents
the mean and the median of the three psychological variables (better than average, mis-
calibration and hindsight bias score) for the three earnings group. As can be seen in the
table, there is no strong variation in biases from one earnings group to the other. The
median miscalibration score is .726 for low earnings bankers and .650 for high earnings
bankers.19 The median better than average score is .207 for the low earnings bankers and
.261 for the high earnings bankers.20 Such small variations from one earnings group to
the other contrast with the large variations observed for the median hindsight bias, which
falls from .636 for the low earnings bankers to .375 for the high earnings bankers. And the
19Thus, for low earnings bankers the true answer fell outside the bounds given by the participants
72.6% of the time, while for the high earnings bankers it did so 65% of the time.
20Thus, low earnings bankers answered that 20.7% of their colleagues were better than themselves,
while high earnings bankers answered that 26.1% of their colleagues were better than themselves.
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average miscalibration score and better than average score are not significantly different
across earnings groups, in contrast to what we reported above for the hindsight bias.
5 Conclusion
Do cognitive biases affect information processing and performance in financial markets?
In this paper we addressed that question, focusing on the hindsight bias. Agents who
exhibit this bias fail to remember how ignorant they were before observing outcomes
and answers. We show that this hinders learning, and, in particular, lead agents to
underestimate volatility. This results in inefficient portfolio choice, loss—making trades
and poor risk management. We rely on two experimental studies to test these claims.
In the first experimental study, we focus on the consequences of the hindsight bias on
learning about volatility. We compare two treatments: one in which the bias is muted,
and the other where it can manifest itself. Agents give lower volatility updates in the
latter treatment than in the former, as implied by our model.
In the second experimental study, we test the hypothesis that the hindsight bias hurts
financial performance. We collect psychometric and performance data about highly paid
investment bankers. We find that they exhibit hindsight bias when asked questions about
economics, banking and finance, and that experience does not reduce this bias. Most
importantly, we find that bankers with low bias obtain significantly better performance.
Given that our results suggest the hindsight bias matters, it would be interesting
to provide a deeper theoretical analysis of this bias. Could it emerge from cognitive
constraints, such as limited memory? How would biased agents strategically interact in a
trading game? We leave these issues for further research.
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Table 1: Hindsight bias and risk perception in Study 1
The table reports medians computed across agents. p—values are in parentheses.
BASF IKB EON Postbank Premiere Oil Gold Dollar
Hindsight bias 0.086 0.463 0.155 0.784 0.375 0.182 0.094 0.264
(0.344) (0.009) (0.166) (0.000) (0.626) (0.074) (0.052) (0.108)
Initial implied σ/
remembered σ 1.142 1.267 1.000 1.577 1.273 1.090 1.000 .944
Treatment 1 (0.082) (0.002) (0.822) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.517) (0.525)
True surprise.
Treatment 0. 2340 25 57004 737 12 3320 418167 1.5
True surprise.
Treatment 1. 3026 22 34649 717 18 5867 226082 1.1
Rank sum test
difference between (0.969) (0.787) (0.150) (0.435) (0.817) (0.777) (0.164) (0.472)
Treatments 0 & 1
Biased surprise
Treatment 1 2073 8 21007 215 38 5504 187809 .7
Rank sum test
difference between (0.910) (0.667) (0.158) (0.866) (0.278) (0.765) (0.024) (0.041)
true & biased (0.910) (0.667) (0.158) (0.866) (0.278) (0.765) (0.024) (0.041)
surprise
Initial implied σ/
subsequent implied σ
Treatment 0 .923 1.024 .630 1.001 1.041 .981 .996 .892
Initial implied σ/
subsequent implied σ
Treatment 1 .978 1.373 0.858 1.854 1.407 1.003 0.846 0.910
Rank sum test for
difference between (0.172) (0.021) (0.099) (0.002) (0.001) (0.349) (0.520) (0.369)
Treatments 0 & 1
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Table 2: Bankers population in Study 2
Location Earnings Number Average Age Average Experience
FRANKFURT High 12 34 11.83
Mid 12 34.50 12.50
Low 17 29.76 7.06
LONDON High 14 41.86 18
Mid 14 34.07 9.89
Low 16 32.38 6.36
Table 3, Panel A: Hindsight bias questions and results in Study 2. Frankfurt
sample.
Question True Other group This group prediction Bias
answer answer (given true answer)
FRANKFURT A
Consumer price change 2.5 1.68 2.9 1.49
Germany
10/2000 to 10/2001
Drop of Swiss 30 38.55 35.24 0.39
stock market from
all time high to 10/2001
Change in price of gold 6.2 13.69 6.53 0.96
10/2000 to 10/2001
Number of bankers 200 3477.27 691.74 0.85
at Lazard 8/2001
% of Merrill Lynch’s 10 31.32 20.29 0.52
earnings from asset
management in 2001
FRANKFURT B
Euro/Yen exchange rate 109 135.85 103.41 1.21
2/13/2001
Ratio of foreign debt 38.4 176.69 59.5 0.85
to GDP in Brazil
at the end of 2000
Net revenues drop 1285 1034.06 925.05 -0.43
Texas Instruments
end of third quarter 2001
Growth rate of real GDP 8.3 5.57 5.02 -0.20
Russia 2000
Growth rate of real GDP 4.1 3.5 3.66 0.27
OECD countries, 2000
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Table 3, Panel B: Hindsight bias questions and results in Study 2. London
sample.
Question True Other group This group prediction Bias
answer answer (given true answer)
LONDON A
Retail Price Index change 1.57 5.37 5.61 -0.06
10/2000 to 10/2001
Drop of Swiss stock market 39.17 32.06 37.4 0.75
from all time high to 8/2002
Change in price of gold 6.2 21.88 10.48 0.73
from 10/2000 to 10/2001
Bankers at Lazard 200 1876.36 641.88 0.74
in August 2001
% Merrill Lynch’s earnings 10 22.08 18.88 0.27
from asset management, 2001
LONDON B
Euro/Yen exchange rate 116.1 135.5 122.22 0.68
2/13/2002
Ratio of foreign debt to GDP 38.4 126.24 57.83 0.78
Brazil, end of 2000
Net revenue increase TI 1.06 -4.35 -3.47 0.16
2nd quarter 2002
Growth rate of real GDP 5 4.25 4.92 0.89
Russia, 2001
Growth rate of real in GDP 1.2 3.75 2.12 0.64
OECD countries 2001
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Table 4: Average Hindsight Bias in Study 2
Bias in London Bias in Frankfurt
Median 0.635 0.5
Mean 0.547 0.579
Std. Deviation 0.88 0.786
Number of Observations 49 41
Table 5: Hindsight bias for the three earnings categories in Study 2
Pool Frankfurt London
Earnings Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
Median 0.636 0.684 0.375 0.512 0.63 0.303 0.636 0.809 0.429
Mean 0.546 0.924 0.192 0.678 0.883 0.133 0.546 0.959 0.242
Std. Dev. 1.009 0.833 0.638 0.737 0.948 0.473 1.009 0.757 0.766
Nb obs 33 26 26 17 12 12 16 16 14
Table 6: Significance of the difference between biases across earnings
categories in Study 2
z-stat p-value in percent
High versus middle 3.33 .09
High versus low 2.27 2.29
Middle versus low 1.02 30.6
Table 7: Estimated conditional probabilities in Study 2
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .46 .32 .14
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .14 .39 .38
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .39 .29 .48
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Table 8: Hindsight bias controlling for experience in Study 2
Earnings
Low Mid High
Experience
Less than 10 years Number of
observations 27 13 4
Average
experience
(in years) 5.1 6.17 5.78
Median bias .61 .85 .055
Mean bias .55 1.12 -.055
10 years or more Number of
observations 6 13 22
Average
experience
(in years) 13.83 15.61 16.87
Median bias .77 .64 .43
Mean bias .69 .72 .23
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Table 9: Probability of performance, conditional on hindsight bias, for the
three occupational categories in Study 2
Panel A: Research
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .57 .14 .00
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .0 .14 .50
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .43 .71 .50
Panel B: Sales
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .57 .29 .21
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .14 .43 .43
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .29 .29 .36
Panel C: Trading and Sales-trading
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .20 .40 .00
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .20 .40 .25
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .60 .20 .75
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Table 10: Probability of performance, conditional on hindsight bias, for the
three mistake ratio categories in Study 2
Panel A: Lowest mistake ratio
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .55 .20 .33
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .11 .40 .50
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .33 .40 .17
Panel B: Medium mistake ratio
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .45 .20 .33
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .22 .60 .20
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .33 .20 .47
Panel C: Largest mistake ratio
Low bias Mid bias High bias
Prob(High Earnings|bias) .34 .20 .20
Prob(Mid Earnings|bias) .22 .20 .45
Prob(Low Earnings|bias) .44 .60 .35
Table 11: Hindsight bias, miscalibration and better than average for the
three earnings categories in Study 2
Miscalibration Better than average Hindsight bias
Low earnings Mean 0.701 0.207 0.546
Median 0.726 0.207 0.636
Medium Earnings Mean 0.681 0.296 0.924
Median 0.663 0.294 0.684
High Earnings Mean 0.666 0.245 0.192
Median 0.650 0.261 0.375
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